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COMMENT
Insurance Anti-Rebate Statutes and Dade
County Consumer Advocates v. Department of
Insurance: Can a 19th Century Idea Protect
Modern Consumers?
In 1984, a Florida court of appeals held that the Florida
statutes prohibiting insurance agents from rebating part of their
commissions to customers violated the due process clause of the
Florida Constitution.' The court concluded that no rational rela-
1. Dade County Consumer Advocates Office v. Dep't of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984). At the time this Comment was going to press, the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed the district court of appeals decision. See id., of'd, No. 66,178 (June 3,
1986). This Comment generally cites to the court of appeals opinion.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.611(11) (1984) provides:
The department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or con-
tinue the license of any agent,. . . and it shall suspend or revoke the eligibility
to hold a license ... of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant,
licensee, or permittee any one or more of the following applicable grounds
exist: . . .
(11) Rebating, or attempt thereat, or unlawfully dividing or
offering to divide his commission with another.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541(1)(h)1(1984) provides:
(1) The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices:...
(h) Rebates. -
1. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, or in an applicable filing
with the department, knowingly:
a. Permitting, or offering to make, or making, any contract or agreement to
such contract other than as plainly expressed in the insurance contract issued
thereon;
b. Paying, allowing, or giving, or offering to pay, allow, or give, directly or
indirectly, as inducement to such insurance contract, any rebate of premiums
on the contract, any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other bene-
fits thereon, or any valuable consideration of inducement whatever not speci-
fied in the contract;
c. Giving, selling, or purchasing, or offering to give, sell, or purchase, as
inducement to such insurance contract or in connection therewith, any stocks,
bonds or other securities of any insurance company or other corporation, asso-
ciation, or other corporation, association, or partnership, or any dividends or
profits accrued thereon, or anything of value whatsoever not specified in the
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tionship exists between the anti-rebate statutes and the legiti-
mate state purpose of protecting the public.2
The Florida decision is noteworthy because every state pro-
hibits insurance agents and brokers from rebating to their cus-
tomers a part of the commission earned from the sale of an
insurance policy. In addition, every state prohibits unfair dis-
insurance contract.
The due process clause of the Florida Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any
criminal matter to be a witness against himself.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
2. Dade County Consumer Advs. v. Dept. of Ins., 457 So. 2d at 497.
3. State insurance code provisions governing unfair methods of competition and
unfair and deceptive acts and practices exist in every state, patterned after a model act
promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Particular anti-
rebate code sections are noted in parentheses:
ALA. CODE §§ 27-12-1 to 24 (1975), (§ 27-12-12); ALASKA STAT. §§
21.36.010-.350 (1984), (Q§ 21.36.100,.120); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-441-.471
(1956), (Q§ 20-449,-451); ARK STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3001 to -3014 (1980), (Q 66-
3005(8)); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790 - ]790.110 (West 1972), (§ 750); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 10-3-1101 to -1112 (1973), (§ 10-3-1104(g)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
38-60 to -64 (1958), (Q 38-59); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2301 - 2314 (1974), (18
§ 2304(14)); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-701 - 714 (1982), (Q§ 56-704(2), -712; HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 431-641 to -648 (1984), (Q 431-643(8)); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-1301 to
-1331 (1977 & Supp. 1985), (§ 41-1314(1)); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 73, § 1028-1041
(Smith-Hurd 1965); ILL. REV. STAT. § 485.1; IND. CODE §§ 27-4-1-1 to -18 (Burns
1985), (Q 27-4-1-4(8)); IOWA CODE §§ 507B.1 to - .14 (Supp. 1985), (Q 507B.4(8)
and (b)); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2401 to -2414 (1981), (Q 40-2404(8)(a), 1981 &
Supp. (b)); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 304.12-010 to -210 (1981 & Supp. 1984), (§
304.12-090); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:1211 - :1217 (1968), (Q 22:1214(8)); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A §§ 2151-2182 (1970), (Q 2160); MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, §§ 212-234 (1979) (Q 224); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, §§ 1 - 14
(West 1985), (Q 3(8)); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §8 500.2001 to .2093 (West
1983), (Q 500.2066); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72A.17 - .31 (West Supp. 1985), (Q
72A.20 subd. 10); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 83-5-29 to -51 (1972), (Q 83-3-121); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 375.930 - .948 (Vernon Supp. 1986), (§ 375.936(8)); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-18-101 to -1005 (1985), (Q 33-18-210); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-1522 to
-1535 (1984), (Q 44-1525(8)); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 686A.010 - .280 (1985), (§
686A.110 - .120, 130); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 417:1 - :17 (1983), (Q 417:4IX);
N.J. REv. STAT. Ann. §§ 17:29B-1 to -14 (1985), (Q 17:29B-4(8)); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59A-16-1 to -30 (1978), (Q 59-16-15); N.Y. LAW §§ 2401 - 2408 (McKin-
ney 1985), (Q§ 2324, 2402); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.1 to .13 (1982 & Supp.
1985), ( 58-54.4(8)); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 26.1-04-01 to -19 (Supp. 1985),
(Q 26.1-04-03(8)); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3901.19 - .22 (Page 1971 & Supp.
1984), (Q 3901.21(G)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 1201-1219 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1985), (Q 1204(8)); OR Rav. STAT. §§ 746.005 - .270 (1985), (Q 746.045);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1171.1-.15 (Purdon Supp. 1985), (§ 1171.5(a)(8)); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 27-29-1 to -11 (1979), (Q 27-29-4(8)); S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-55-10
to 38-55-410 (Law. Co-op. 1976), (Q 38-55-140); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§
58-33-1 to 46.1 (1978), (§ 58-33-14); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-8-101 to -118
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crimination in pricing insurance policies and prohibits agree-
ments between agents and insureds that are not clearly
expressed in the insurance policy.' Collectively, these prohibi-
tions are designed to prevent insurer insolvency and unfair
competition.5
The Florida case highlights a growing controversy over
whether these statutes should prevent individual insurance pur-
chasers from negotiating with the agent the price for the services
rendered by the agent-the agent's commission. The controversy
involves challenges both to the current marketing system of the
insurance industry and to fundamental assumptions about con-
sumer protections enacted nearly a century ago. This Comment
reviews the history and application of anti-rebate laws, analyzes
the arguments presented in the Florida decision, and suggests a
(Supp. 1985), (Q 56-8-104(7)); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 and 21.21-2
(1973), (Q 21.21 §4(8)); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-4 (1974), (Q 31-27-
14); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4721 (1984), (Q 4724(8)); VA. CODE §§ 38.1-49 to -
57.1 (1981), (Q 38.1-52.8); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.30.010 to - .270 (1983 &
Supp. 1984), (Q 48.30.140, .170) (1983); W. VA. CODE §§ 33-11-1 to -10 (1982 &
Supp. 1985), (Q 33-11-4(8), 33-11-4(8)(c) (Supp. 1985)); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§
628.31 - .46 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985), (Q 628.34(2)); and WYo. STAT. §§ 26-13-
101 to 26-13-123 (1977), (Q§ 26-13-110,-112).
4. In addition to an Unfair Practices Act, states may also have particular prohibi-
tions that are used to prevent rebating, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.180, .480, 48.19.020
(1983).
Washington Revised Code § 48.18.180 provides:
Stated premium must include all charges:
(1) The premium stated in the policy shall be inclusive of all fees,
charges, premiums, or other consideration charged for the insurance or for the
procurement thereof.
(2) No insurer or its officer, employee, agent, solicitor, or other represen-
tative shall charge or receive any fee, compensation, or consideration for insur-
ance which is not included in the premium specified in the policy.
(3) Each violation of this section is a gross misdemeanor.
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.180 (1983).
Washington Revised Code § 48.18.480 provides:
Discrimination prohibited.
No Insurer shall make or permit any unfair discrimination between
insureds or subjects of insurance having substantially like insuring, risk, and
exposure factors, and expense elements, in the terms or conditions of any
insurance contract, or in the rate or amount of premium charged therefore
[sic], or in the benefits payable or in any other rights or privileges accruing
thereunder. This provision shall not prohibit fair discrimination by a life
insurer as between individuals having unequal expectation of life.
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.480 (1985).
5. "All insured persons should be treated the same under like circumstances without
having to shop around for agents or companies who will accept less than full premiums."
C. CENTER & R. HEINS, INSURANCE AND GOVERNMENT 44 (1962).
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transitional approach to ending a system of fixed commissions
for insurance agents and brokers.
I. HISTORY
Anti-rebate statutes have century-old roots that marked the
beginning of the now pervasive state regulation of insurance.
The close supervision of insurance companies today is a result of
serious abuses in the conduct of the life insurance business in
the late 1800s.1
The rapid growth and cut-throat competition in life insur-
ance markets in the late 1800s created an environment in which
greed, theft, and deceit flourished. 7 Companies and agents used
any means necessary to increase sales and profits.8 To attract
sales, agents would split their commissions with some of their
policyholders.9 As the practice escalated, companies paid
increasingly larger commissions to retain agents and permit
agents to offer larger rebates. 10 Those companies paying the
highest commissions attracted the most agents." The more
agents a company had, the more a company could increase its
6. A. MOWBRAY, R. BLANCHARD, & C. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE 518-19 (6th ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as MOWBRAY].
7. H. GRANT, INSURANCE REFORM 8-9 (1979).
8. Practices commonly used by agents and companies to increase sales and profits
included "twisting," false policy dividend promises, harsh policy forfeiture provisions,
and fraud by "lightening agents" who sold as many policies as possible and quickly left
town. Id. The MODEL UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT prohibits most of these practices, and all
states have statutes governing policy forfeitures, e.g. WASH. REv. CODE § 48.30.040 (1983)
(prohibiting false information and advertising), § 48.30.090 (1983) (prohibiting misrepre-
sentation of policies), § 48.30.180 (1983) (prohibiting "twisting," defined as "induc[ing]
any insured to lapse, terminate, forfeit, surrender, retain, or convert any insurance pol-
icy"), and § 48.76.020 (1983) ( requiring certain nonforfeiture and cash surrender provi-
sions in life insurance policies).
9. GRANT, supra note 7, at 9. See also S. CLOUGH, AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 143
(1946) (existing policyholders complained so loudly about inequitable rebates that the
company eventually replaced the rebates with an overall reduction in premiums).
10. GRANT, supra note 7, at 9. See also M. JAMES, THE METROPOLIrAN LIF 31-32
(1947) ("commissions increased from 10 percent on new business and 5 on renewals in
1860 to 33-1/3 percent and 16-2/3 percent respectively-the average being 25 and 10-in
1866"); M. KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910, at 74 (1963) (Vice-presi-
dent of New York Life "reported in 1896 that the Equitable and the Mutual offered
discounts of up to 80 percent to secure new business").
11. Insurance companies attempted to thwart agent "stealing" by agreeing that an
agent could leave a company to go work for another company only by obtaining the
original employer's permission. "Nevertheless, mass raids on agents continued into the
early 1900's." KELLER, supra note 10, at 74.
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market share.12
Policyholders who did not receive a rebate realized that if
an agent could afford to rebate so much, then the policy was not
worth as much as was paid.' s Clearly, some policyholders were
subsidizing the rebates being paid to other policyholders; thus
rebates were condemned as unfairly discriminatory.1 4
Policyholders were not the only ones who complained:
rebating led to ruinous competition among insurance companies.
The practice threatened company solvency and agents' liveli-
hood.15 The cost of obtaining and keeping policyholders
increased as agents used their large commissions to offer rebates
to policyholders of rival companies in an effort to convince those
policyholders to switch companies. 16 Agents who could not offer
as substantial rebates as competing agents lost customers and
thus renewal commissions. As expenses to attract and keep busi-
ness mounted, agents and companies themselves called for
reform.17
Reform came in 1889. New York became the first state to
adopt an "anti-discrimination" statute. 8 The statute prohibited
rebating by prohibiting discrimination between individuals of
the same actuarial class-everyone in the class had to pay the
same price for the same policy.' Three other states adopted
12. CLOUGH, supra note 9, at 92, 158-63.
13. GRANT, supra note 7, at 9-10.
14. One early newspaper described the consumer attitude toward rebates:
Nothing has grown faster in the life insurance business than the rebate
system. It is admitted to be an error of management. It has been prohibited in
some states and may be prohibited in other states on the ground that it causes
an unjust discrimination, giving to one man an advantage over another man in
the cost of his insurance, thereby destroying that equality of contribution
between persons of equal age who receive similar benefits, which is the very
essence of a fairly conducted insurance business.
H. JOSEPHSON, DISCRIMINATION - A STUDY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN LIE
INSURANCE 14 (1960) (quoting The Chronicle, January 1889).
15. KELLER, supra note 10, at 72-73; GRANT, supra note 7, at 11-13.
16. GRANT, supra note 7, at 12; see also S. KiMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
123 (1960).
17. KELLER, supra note 10, at 72-73; GRANT, supra note 7, at 11-13.
18. 1889 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 282 §1, now N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2602, 2606 (McKinney Supp.
1985).
19. Although discrimination is the effect of a rebate, discrimination and rebating are
often used synonymously.
The early concept of a rebate was difficult to disassociate from discrimina-
tion. . . .[D]iscrimination technically involves the making of a distinction in
the amount of premiums to be paid or benefits received between individuals of
the same class which are not associated with the risk, while rebating is the
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similar measures that same year.2 By 1895, twenty-one states
had enacted anti-rebate laws.2 1 Despite the laws, however, rebat-
ing continued.2 2
In 1895, in response to the ineffectiveness of anti-rebate
statutes and under pressure from the National Association of
Life Underwriters, thirty insurance companies signed an anti-
rebate agreement.2 s The agreement provided that the signatory
companies would fire any agent found guilty of rebating, and no
company would hire the agent for one year.24 By 1899, the agree-
ment had totally collapsed.2 5 "At more or less regular intervals
everyone swore off; rebating was abolished; and then quite to
everyone's surprise, there it was still, a dirty but rugged brat,
nobody's in particular, not even conceived in sin and iniq-
uity-just a sort of spontaneous conception of the industry."2 6
In 1906, publicized accounts of insurance company extravagance
and mismanagement caused the New York Legislature to create
the Armstrong Committee.2 The committee was charged with
giving or offering to give of any valuable consideration as an inducement to
insurance which is not specified in the policy ...
. . .[O nce the terms of the preferential agreement are incorporated into
the policy, the question is no longer one of rebating but of discrimination.
J. BROCK, BAITS AND REBATES 378, 383 (December 10, 1963) (footnote omitted) (paper
presented to the Association of Life Insurance Counsel at the Waldorf Astoria, New
York, NY. At the time of presentation, Mr. Brock was General Counsel for National Life
Insurance Company, Vermont); see also E. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN
THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIvE LAW & PRACTICE 311-21 (1927) (discuss-
ing early case law differentiating particular practices as illegal discrimination or illegal
rebates).
20. JOSEPHSON, supra note 14, at 14 (referring to the Massachusetts, Maine, and
Vermont anti-discrimination statutes of 1889-1890).
21. GRANT, supra note 7, at 12.
22. Id. at 14. The anti-rebate laws did not work because of lapses in enforcement
and widespread abuse; thus, if some agents were rebating, other agents had to rebate in
order to remain competitive.
23. Id. at 12-13.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at 13-14. KELLER, supra note 10, at 74.
26. R. CARLYLE BAI , THE AMERICAN LimE CONVENTION 148 (New York 1953).
27. Newspapers and magazines in 1904 and 1905 carried sensationalized accounts of
life insurance companies' mismanagement and their abuse of policyholders. While rebat-
ing was of concern to the public, press accounts of company spending and investment
practices raised a public furor for reform. A fight for control of Equitable Life Insurance
company became public and revealed incredible abuses, notably the lavish "French Ball"
thrown by the bachelor son of Equitable's founder at a cost of nearly $100,000. An inves-
tigation of Equitable by a special blue ribbon committee appointed by the Equitable
Board of Directors concluded "that exorbitant salaries were being paid to officers and
favored employees, that excessive commissions were being given to field agents, that
[Vol. 9:499
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investigating "the business and affairs of life insurance compa-
nies doing business in the State of New York" and recom-
mending statutory changes. 28 The findings and recommenda-
tions from the Armstrong investigation led to comprehensive
revision of state laws regulating insurance, including stricter
laws governing insurance agent compensation.
The Armstrong Committee recommended, and the legisla-
ture adopted, statutes limiting commission earnings, limiting
premium collection charges, prohibiting loans to agents unless
proper collateral was obtained, and prohibiting all bonuses,
prizes and rewards for new business .2  The committee also rec-
ommended strengthening anti-rebate laws. The legislature
responded by making illegal not only the giving of a rebate, but
also its receipt.30
In the years immediately following the Armstrong investiga-
tion, other states adopted strict insurance laws mirroring those
adopted in New York.31 The insurance industry made several
attempts to convince the New York Legislature and other legis-
latures to modify the restrictions on agent commissions but
failed.32 For example, in 1908 the New York Legislature passed a
bill that liberalized the statute governing agent commissions,
but the governor vetoed the changes.33 Eventually, the strict reg-
ulation of agent compensation was supported by the insurance
industry because of pressure by agents.3 '
inadequate accounting procedures for disbursements existed, and that company funds
were being used to support prices of Wall Street securities in which Equitable officers
were intimately interested." This finding was subsequently confirmed by the New York
State Insurance Department. GRANT, supra note 7, at 34. For a complete account of these
abuses and others, see generally id. at 28-54; see also JAMES, supra note 10, at 139-66;
CLOUGH, supra note 10, at 215-35.
28. CLOUGH, supra note 10, at 219.
29. Id. at 226. See NEw YORK INSURANCE LAW § 4429 (McKinney 1985).
30. CLOUGH, supra note 10, at 227 n.34.
31. GRANT, supra note 7, at 53. Wisconsin conducted its own "Armstrong" investiga-
tion leading to comprehensive reform of insurance laws. See generally id. at 55-71.
Washington State adopted a law extensively regulating life insurance. 1909 Wash. Laws
Ch. 142. Rebating was specifically prohibited. 1909 Wash. Laws Ch. 143 § 19, 21.
32. GRANT, supra note 7, at 57.
33. GRANT, supra note 7, at 58. In Wisconsin, 24 insurance companies, constituting
two-thirds of the companies doing business in the state, stopped doing business in an
effort to pressure the Wisconsin legislature into repeal of some of the reform laws. The
plan backfired. The public expressed outrage at the tactics of the companies, and the
legislature created a state-owned insurance company. The company never did much bus-
iness, but the state had made its point; several years later, the companies returned.
GRANT, supra note 7, at 60-63.
34. GRANT, supra note 7, at 59.
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In 1944, the United States Supreme Court held, in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,35 that the
business of insurance was subject to federal antitrust prohibi-
tions. The Court found that insurance was an interstate transac-
tion and thus could be regulated by Congress."0 Shortly after the
case was decided, the insurance industry pressed for congres-
sional action to overturn the decision. 7 In response, Congress
adopted the McCarran-Ferguson Act,38 exempting the business
of insurance from federal antitrust laws to the extent that indi-
vidual states regulated insurance. In an effort to avoid applica-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Unfair Trade Act,39 the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) developed, and
the states subsequently adopted, the Model Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act.40 The Act generally prohibited rebating and specifi-
cally defined certain types of prohibited transactions as
rebating.41
Today, every state has an unfair trade practices act pat-
35. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
36. Id. at 539-53.
37. Ironically, the insurance industry fought state regulation of insurance a couple
of decades earlier and attempted to convince Congress to amend the Constitution so that
Congress could regulate insurance. GRANT, supra, note 7, at 161-62.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976). "[Alfter June 30, 1948 . . .the Sherman Act...
the Clayton Act, and. . . the Federal Trade Commission Act. . .shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
Id. at § 1012(b). See generally Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance Companies: The
Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1340 (1974); Note, The Limits
of State Regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue
Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 427 (1974).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination in prices and services). See
Stelzer, The Insurance Industry and the Anti-Trust Laws: A Decade of Experience, 386
INS. L.J. 137, 147-48 (March 1955).
40. The MODEL AcT provides, in part:
Rebates. (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, knowingly
permitting or offering to make any contract of life insurance, life annuity or
accident and health insurance, or agreement as to such contract other than as
plainly expressed in the contract issued thereon, or paying or allowing or giving
or offering to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly, as inducement to such
insurance, or annuity, any rebate of premiums payable on the contract, or any
special favor or advantage in the dividends or other benefits thereon, or any
valuable consideration or inducement whatever not specified in the contract, or
giving, or selling, or purchasing or offering to give, sell, or purchase as induce-
ment to such insurance of annuity of in connection therewith, any stocks,
bonds, or other securities of any insurance company or other corporation, asso-
ciation, or partnership, or any dividends or profits accrued thereon, or any-
thing of value whatsoever not specified in the contract.
1947 PRoc. NAT'L A. INS. CoMMRs., 392, 394.
41. Id.
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terned after the NAIC Model Act."2 Some states have additional
statutes prohibiting rebating, for these statutes in many cases
predated the Model Act, and some states have expanded the
application of the anti-rebate provisions of the Model Act to all
types of insurance.43
II. THE FLORIDA DECISION
"We are unable to find any legitimate state interest justify-
ing the continued existence of the anti-rebate statutes."" With
this statement, a Florida court of appeals, in Dade County Con-
sumer Advocates Office v. Department of Insurance, struck
down Florida's anti-rebate statutes, which had been adopted in
1915.4' The court held that the statutes violated the Florida
Constitution's due process clause by constituting "an unjustified
exercise of the police power. 46
The decision in Dade County ended a seven-year legal effort
to overcome the anti-rebate laws. In 1977, a licensed Florida
insurance agent, Joseph Blumenthal, had sued the Florida
Department of Insurance, arguing that the anti-rebate laws pre-
vented him from competing for insurance sales.'7 The lower
court held that the laws were constitutional, and Mr. Blumen-
thal appealed to the state supreme court." While his appeal was
pending, Mr. Blumenthal died, and his case was dismissed as
moot. 49
In May of 1983, Walter Dartland, Director of the Dade
County Consumer Advocates Office, sued the Florida Depart-
42. See supra note 3.
43. E.g., 1909 Wash. Laws Ch. 142 §§ 19, 21 predates Washington's Unfair Trade
Practices Act, WASH. REv. CODE Ch. 48.30. See also WASH. REv. CODE § 48.30.140
(prohibiting rebates for all lines of insurance except marine insurance). The Texas State
Constitution prohibits rebates: "That all drawbacks and rebatement of insurance,
freight, transportation. . . are forever prohibited, and it shall be the duty of the Legisla-
ture to pass effective laws punishing all persons in this State who pay, receive or contract
for, or respecting the same." TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 25 (emphasis added).
44. Dade County Consumer Advocates Office v. Department of Ins. 457 So. 2d 495,
497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
45. Id.; see 1915 Fla. Laws § 1 ch. 6849.
46. 457 So. 2d at 499. The standard of review is "whether the challenged anti-rebate
statutes reasonably and substantially promote the public health, safety or welfare." Id.
at 497 (citing Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949)
and 10 FLA. Jura 2d Constitutional Law §§ 211, 214 (1979 and Supp. 1983)).
47. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5, Blumenthal v. Department of Insurance, No.
77-355 (Leon County Cir. Ct.)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Blumenthal v. Department of Insurance, No. 53,933 (July 25, 1979)).
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ment of Insurance, challenging the state anti-rebate statutes.50
Dartland argued that the anti-rebate statutes violated the Flor-
ida Constitution "because they unreasonably promote the inter-
ests of a limited group of individuals, insurance agents, to the
detriment of Mr. Dartland and other Dade County consum-
ers." 1 The trial judge, finding no genuine issues of material fact,
granted summary judgment to the Department of Insurance."2
The judge ruled that the statutes were a valid exercise of state
police power and state regulatory authority in protecting the
public. 3 On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals
reversed."
The Florida Insurance Department argued that the "insur-
ance industry is so affected with the public interest as to be sub-
ject to state regulation under its police power[,] from the licens-
ing of agents to the rates for policies." 55 The Department argued
that anti-rebate statutes are a "legitimate and constitutional
exercise of [a] state's police power,"5 for they prevent ruinous
competition by insurers. Thus, by preventing discrimination
among similarly situated policyholders, the statutes foster
insurer solvency.5 7 The court found, however, that the strongest
argument for the Department, presented by amici curiae, was
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id. at 7. See also Answer Brief of Appellees at 2.
53. Answer Brief of Appellees at 2. Appellees argued that if the appellate court
found that the granting of summary judgment was erroneous, appellees should be per-
mitted to submit evidence and argument controverting appellants' arguments. Answer
Brief at 3. Apparently, the Insurance Department filed a motion to dismiss based upon
procedural arguments, and Dade County filed a motion for summary judgment that had
been pending for three months prior to the trial court's decision. Brief of Plaintiffs-
appellants at 7, Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5. Although the Insurance
Department had not requested summary judgment, the judge granted summary judg-
ment in the Department's favor and, according to the Department, summary judgment
was granted without reliance on the affidavits filed by the parties. Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 7, Answer Brief of Appellees at 2.
The issue of summary judgment and the request for remand in the event of an
appellate decision adverse to the Insurance Department was critical to the department,
since apparently the Department did not attempt to controvert Dade County's evidence
at trial. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5, Answer Brief of Appellees at 2. Ulti-
mately, the appellate court relied upon the evidence presented by Plaintiffs-Appellants
at trial and did not permit remand. See Dade County, 457 So. 2d at 497 nn. 3 & 4; Reply
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4-6.
54. Dade County, 457 So. 2d at 498.
55. Answer Brief of Appellees at 7.
56. Id. at 18.
57. Id. at 18, 20.
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that the statute promoted agent professionalism."
The Dade County Consumer Advocates Office argued that
the public is better served by allowing insureds and agents to
negotiate commission rates. 9 Appellants supported this argu-
ment by drawing analogies to other professional services, 60 by
citing other statutes that promote the same goals as the anti-
rebate statute, 1 and by countering the positive goals of the stat-
ute with examples of its negative effects.62 Appellants character-
58. 457 So. 2d at 497 n.2. The Florida Association of Life Underwriters, the Florida
Association of Insurance Agents, and the American Council of Life Insurance, Inc., filed
briefs on behalf of the Department. According to plaintiffs-appellants, amici arguments
support setting a fixed price for any service or commodity rather than explain what con-
siderations justify a set commission, by arguing that competition may increase costs, that
less sophisticated policyholders would lose out, and that the stability of the insurance
contract would be undermined. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, 3.
59. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10-13.
60. Id. Plaintiffs-Appellants noted that doctors, lawyers, and stockbrokers can nego-
tiate their fees. As appellants stated, "every other profession operates without laws
requiring price fixing." Id. at 11. Appellants concluded, "[i]f people can be trusted to
choose between a qualified attorney and a legal secretary for advice about important
legal matters, they certainly can be trusted to choose between two or more licensed
insurance agents depending on price and other services offered." Id. at 13. Appellants
relied heavily upon The Pricing and Marketing of Insurance, A Report of the U.S.
Department of Justice to the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities. (January 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Justice Department Report]. The report focused upon federal anti-
trust immunities for pricing and marketing insurance. The report, in recommending
deregulation of insurance rates, reviewed current insurance pricing mechanisms and, in
studying fixed insurance rates, noted the problems and inequities of anti-rebate statutes.
See Justice Department Report § VI.
61. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, 4. Appellants generally noted the comprehen-
sive regulation of insurance to prevent fraud and mismanagement and to promote
insurer solvency. The regulation of insurance is quite extensive in all states: e.g., Wash-
ington State authorizes the State Insurance Commissioner to examine insurance compa-
nies, rating bureaus, agents, brokers, solicitors, adjusters and any person who holds a
controlling interest in an insurer. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.03.010, .020 (1984). The insur-
ance code sets capital and surplus requirements for insurers, WASH. REV. CODE §
48.05.340 (1984)); governs assets, liabilities and investments of insurers, WASH. REv.
CODE chs. 48.12, 48.13 (1984); requires licensure and regulation of agents, brokers and
solicitors, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 48.17 (1984); sets standards for insurance contracts and
rates, WASH. REV. CODE chs. 48.18, 48.18A, 48.19(1984). There are few, if any, aspects of
insurance that are not regulated.
62. Appellants argued that the anti-rebate statute creates an inherent conflict of
interest for agents and brokers to the extent that agents and brokers sell policies paying
the highest commission rate without regard to consumer need. Appellants noted that the
Public Employees Services Company (PESCO) was asked by Dartland to institute a pro-
gram adopted by Michigan insurers whereby the insurance company provides the policy-
holder with a child safety seat in order to reduce accident losses. PESCO refused, argu-
ing that such a program would violate state anti-rebate laws by giving policyholders
something of value not provided for in the policy. Finally, appellants argued that fixed
commissions promote excessive prices by eliminating agent competition. Brief of Plain-
tiffs-appellants at 10-15.
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ized the anti-rebate statute as an "anti-discount" law. 3
In arguing that states have constitutional authority to regu-
late insurance and that anti-rebate laws generally promote con-
stitutionally legitimate regulatory goals, the Insurance Depart-
ment failed to go beyond traditional rationales supporting anti-
rebate laws. The Department cited various state cases decided
more than a half century ago to support the constitutionality of
the Florida statute." As the court noted, however, "[t]he prece-
dential value and persuasiveness of these cases are severely lim-
ited by the impact of the revolution in consumer's [sic] rights
which has occurred since the turn of the century. '65 Specifically,
the court accepted appellants' argument that recent cases have
rejected consumer protection rationales to support fixed pric-
ing.66 "The paternalistic approach to a consumer's ability to
make reasonable decisions without government intervention as
exemplified by these rulings has been rejected by modern
courts. '67 Thus, arguments supporting an anti-rebate law in
1915 do not necessarily support an anti-rebate law in 1986. If
the anti-rebate laws are necessary to protect the public, that
63. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16. Appellants compared the anti-rebate law to
the old Fair Trade Act, which required retailers to charge consumers the price set by the
wholesaler. Appellant argued that since anti-rebate laws force agents to earn or charge
the insurer's set commission, anti-rebate laws resemble the Fair Trade Act and are actu-
ally "anti-discount" laws. See infra note 109.
64. Answer Brief of Appellees at 9-15, citing State ex rel. Vars V. Knott, 135 Fla.
206, 184 So. 725 (1938); Rideout v. Mars, 99 Miss. 199, 54 So. 801 (1911); Commonwealth
v. Morningstar, 144 Pa. 102, 22 A. 867 (1891); People v. Formosa, 20 N.E. 492 (N.Y.
Crim. 1892); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. People, 209 Ill. 42, 70 N.E. 643 (Ill. 1904);
People v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 252 Ill. 398, 96 N.E. 1049 (1911); Leonard v. American
Life and Annuity Co., 139 !Ga. 274, 772 S.E. 41 (1913); Calvin Phillips & Co. v. Fishback,
84 Wash. 124, 146 P. 181 (1915); Shortridge v. Hipolito Co., 114 Cal. 682, 300 P. 467 (Cal.
2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1931); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); and
Utah Ass'n. of Life Underwriters v. Mountain S.L. Ins. Co., 58 Utah 579, 200 P. 674
(1921).
65. Dade County, 457 So. 2d at 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Appellants noted that
appellees have cited ten cases from other states, giving the impression that
these decisions uphold the constitutionality of laws similar to the Florida stat-
utes challenged in this action. However, eight of these cases are wholly irrele-
vant to the constitutional issues raised in this case. Five of them do not even
concern a constitutional question, and three concern statutes outlawing rebat-
ing by a life insurance company and not by an agent, a prohibition which
plaintiffs specifically have not challenged in this action.
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7. In addition, appellants noted that two cases
held simply that the state may regulate rates, which appellant did not challenge. Id.
66. 457 So. 2d at 498 (citing Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
67. 457 So. 2d at 498.
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necessity must be proved on other grounds; old arguments must
be refined to pinpoint those abuses that could attend the repeal
of the laws.
While traditional arguments supporting anti-rebate laws
may need refinement, both supporters and critics of these stat-
utes often have failed to distinguish the anti-competitive or
price-fixing aspects" of an anti-rebate statute from the statute's
literal and technical application. 9 Anti-rebate laws cast a wide
net prohibiting a variety of practices,70 some of which may
unnecessarily complicate insurance transactions, may be used to
mislead and defraud the public, or may be too difficult to regu-
late adequately.71 Strict reliance upon historic arguments to sup-
port these laws ignores the evolution in insurance regulation and
consumer protection, but strict reliance upon price competition
arguments ignores the complexity and potential benefit of anti-
rebate laws. In short, the problem with the anti-rebate laws are
not that they do not promote consumer protection but rather
that the laws as written are overly broad, thereby both promot-
ing and thwarting consumer interests.
Traditional arguments that anti-rebate laws promote
insurer solvency, prevent discrimination, and ensure agent pro-
68. The heart of appellants' argument was that anti-rebate laws, "more properly
called 'anti-discount' laws,. . . injure consumers by requiring them to pay the full com-
mission for insurance policies, whereas otherwise they could bargain for a lower price."
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1. "The plain purpose and effect of [anti-rebate] stat-
utes is to prohibit price competition or discounting by insurance agents who might other-
wise return a portion of their commissions to their customers." Id. at 4-5.
69. See generally J. BROcK, BAITS AND REBATES, supra note 19, discussing what con-
stitutes a rebate and how the anti-rebate statute operates. See also Kimball and Jack-
son, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 COLUM. L. REV.; PATTERSON, supra note
19, at 307-21.
70. Anti-rebate statutes prohibit more than just offering a cash discount. For exam-
ple, an agent cannot offer stocks, bonds, or other securities as an inducement to sale of a
policy. See supra note 40.
These two things [stock and insurance] should not be confused in the pub-
lic mind. If both are sold at once, the merits of the insurance will not be prop-
erly considered by the insured. It does not follow, of course, that the only way
to prevent these evils is to forbid altogether the sale of stock in connection
with insurance[, for] . . . proper regulation of these sales would minimize
harmful tendencies.
PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 330.
71. These statutes indicate the type of activity which could be used to defraud the
public. However, the Justice Department Report, supra note 60 at 295-96, discusses
rebating as a method of negotiating agent commissions, but does not distinguish rebating
as a discount from the statutory definition of a rebate and the anti-rebate statute's
prohibitions.
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fessionalism are undercut by the existence of statutes specifi-
cally designed to achieve these goals.72 Moreover, traditional
arguments ignore the present reality that insurers can and do
permit reduced commission rates or "discounts" to certain clas-
ses of insurance purchasers, thus contradicting the concept that
anti-rebate laws ensure uniform pricing.78 While rebating may
be a potentially abusive marketing practice, the prohibition on
rebating does not directly address solvency, anti-discrimination,
or agent professionalism. If the anti-rebate statute promotes
these particular goals, the statute does so tangentially and, in so
doing, causes other problems. 5
III. TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS
A. Insurer Solvency
The argument that "the anti-rebate statutes are designed,
in part, to preclude ruinous competition and to promote insurer
solvency" 76  is tenuous at best; other existing statutes are
designed specifically to prevent insolvency and ruinous competi-
tion. 7 Historically, rebates led to insolvency because company
72. See supra note 61; Fogarty, The Case Against Rebating, and Schultz, Rebating:
A Free Market Concept, Best's Review Life/Health Insurance Edition, August, 1985, at
32, 40.
73. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
75. See infra note 144 and accompanying text..
76. Answer Brief of Appellees at 22.
77. The anti-rebate laws may have an indirect effect on promoting insurer solvency,
but other statutes would ensure solvency in the absence of an anti-rebate law. "Company
insolvency is no longer a significant problem due to the states' enactment of 'legal
reserve' balance requirements and rate-setting safeguards." Frankel, Insurance Agent
Commission Deregulation: Antirebate Laws and an Alternative to Repeal, 2:2 J. INs.
REG. 258 (December 1983). Mr. Frankel also notes that statutory limits on commission
rates as, for example, in New York, control company expenses in obtaining new business.
Id. at 259. "Rate wars" are prohibited by the Unfair Practices Acts, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.30.240 (1983): "Any insurer which precipitates, or aids in precipitating or con-
ducting a rate war and by so doing writes or issues a policy of insurance at a less rate
than permitted under its schedules filed with the Commissioner, or below the rate
deemed by [the commissioner] to be proper and adequate to cover the class of risk
insured, shall have its certificate of authority to do business in [Washington] suspended
until such time as the commissioner is satisfied that it is charging a proper rate of premi-
ums." But see State ex. rel Northwest Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 178 Wash. 436, 35 P.2d
24 (1934), narrowly construing Rem. Rev. Stat. § 7157 (WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.240) as
applying only when a rate war actually exists. In addition to this statute, Washington
has a "prior approval" statute for property-casualty insurance, see WASH. REv. CODE §
48.18.110 (2) (1983), which provides: "In addition to the grounds for disapproval of any
such form as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the commissioner may disapprove
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finances were not scrutinized and because reserve and capitaliza-
tion requirements were nonexistent or lenient. 78 With the adop-
tion of statutes strictly regulating loss reserves, for example,
many of the solvency problems associated with rebating have
disappeared.79
As long ago as 1927, the presumption that rebating leads to
insurer insolvency was questioned.80 Rebating had been viewed
as threatening insurer solvency because the insurer might not
collect adequate premiums to cover the insured risk if too much
of the premium were allocated to agent commission. However,
if the insurer maintains adequate reserves based upon the bene-
fits promised rather than upon the actual premium received by
the insurer after rebate, then the insurer will have sufficient
funds to pay claims.82
Another fear for insurer solvency expressed in connection
with rebates is that life insurance policies "issued at rebated ini-
tial premiums will show a larger proportion of lapses after the
first year (when the rebate will no longer be given); thus, a life
insurance company's financial strength will be weakened by the
practice of rebating."8 Life insurance policy premiums collected
during the first year are used primarily to pay agent commis-
any form of disability insurance policy if the benefits provided therein are unreasonable
in relation to the premium charged." WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 284-34 regulates rates for
credit life and credit accident and health insurance. In particular, WASH. ADMIN. CODE R.
284-34-040(3) provides: "Commissions or other payments or allowances to creditors,
agents or general agents shall never be considered a justification, or any part of a justifi-
cation, for a higher rate as being reasonable in relation to benefits."
78. See supra note 27.
79. See infra note 82.
80. PArrERSON, supra note 19, at 308 (an insurer's "practice of rebating does not
necessarily mean insolvency").
81. Id. Most rebating is done by agents and not companies. Insurance companies
pay agent commissions whether or not agents keep the full commissions. "It is the
amount received by the insurance company which determines the financial soundness of
the company." Id.
82. Any problem with inadequate reserves is resolved by regulation requiring addi-
tional reserves. Id. Every state has a "standard valuation" law used to determine life and
annuity contract reserves. These reserve statutes are developed by the NAIC. See WASH.
REV. CODE ch. 48.12 (1983). E.g. WASH. Rav. CODE § 48.12.080(2) (1983) provides: "(2) If
the loss experience of an insurer shows that its loss reserves, however estimated, are
inadequate, the commissioner shall require the insurer to maintain loss reserves in such
increased amount as is needed to make them adequate."
83. PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 308 n.4. In an interesting footnote, Patterson com-
ments on at least two of the cases used by the Florida Insurance Department to support
the Florida anti-rebate statute, suggesting that past courts have sustained the constitu-
tionality of the statute without reviewing the validity of the argument of insurer
solvency.
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sions. In subsequent years, the percentage of premiums
devoted to agent commission decreases8 6 Thus, during the first
year, an agent has more money with which to rebate. The argu-
ment assumes that if agents were permitted to rebate, a policy-
holder would be induced to cancel an existing policy and replace
the policy continually in order to receive the large rebate that
can only come in the first year of the policy.88
The first problem with this argument is that it only applies
to life insurance products, since most property and casualty
insurance policies are written annually.8 7 Moreover, not all life
insurance products have a commission structure that heavily
loads first-year premiums with commission expenses. 8 Despite
this difference, the anti-rebate laws generally apply to all lines of
insurance.
The second problem with this argument is that it implicitly
assumes that most policyholders would see only a benefit in
replacing a policy;89 consumers would not be bothered by other
aspects of annual policy turnover, such as new applications, con-
testability periods, and benefit losses. The argument thus
assumes that price is the consumer's sole criterion. Moreover,
the argument ignores the possibility that insurance companies
might simply choose to restructure policy pricing to avoid the
problem.90 The incentive to replace a policy lies more with the
84. MowBRAY, supra note 6, at 398.
85. Id.
86. Insurance Agent Commission Deregulation, 1981: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on General Oversight of the Comm. on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearing].
87. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 147. "Outside of life insurance, rebates
are most often a constant percentage of each year's commission, the continuing rebate
being necessary to secure the business against attacks of rebating competitors. In life
insurance, however, renewal commissions are small so that continuing rebates are not
practical, and the rebate seems generally limited to all or a part of the first year
commission."
88. Life insurance products, from term insurance to universal life insurance, offer a
wide array of compensation options for agents. Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company,
for example, recently advertised an annually renewable term insurance policy that allows
the agent to determine how commissions would be paid-high first-year commissions or
steady level commissions for a number of years. 86 BEsT's REvIEw Lnv/HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE EDITION 1 (May 1985). The California Association of Life Underwriters proposed a
level commission plan eliminating high first-year commissions. Haggerty, Cal. Agents
Chief Proposes Level Commission Plan, The National Underwriter, Oct. 23, 1982, at 2.
89. 1981 Hearing, supra note 86, at 9-11.
90. A level commission schedule, ending high first-year commissions, would reduce
the incentive to rebate, and a company reduction in the agent's commission earnings
would not permit the agent to rebate without causing the agent significant income losses.
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agent than with the policyholder.O'Inducing policy replacement
is a problem of misrepresentation and false advertising, for
under certain circumstances, a policyholder is actually benefited
by replacing a policy.9 2 Inducing policy replacement not for the
policyholder's benefit but to enhance commission earnings is
commonly known as "twisting."I s Twisting, however, exists in
spite of anti-rebate laws and, in some instances, may be
encouraged by insurance company practices of offering large
commissions to increase sales of a new product.9 4 In an effort to
combat the problem of twisting, some states have adopted regu-
lations strictly governing the replacement of life insurance poli-
cies.' 5 Twisting thus is another problem that could be addressed
Moreover, greater reliance on group sales, mass marketing, and direct writing by insurers
could reduce insurer expenses in obtaining new business and avoid some of the costs
associated with commissions. See generally S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE
598-602 (10th ed. 1982).
91. See Testimony of John Regan: "Many companies have two term or two whole
life . . . products in their rate books where the only significant difference is in the com-
missions .. " 1981 Hearings, supra note 86, at 41. Thus, depending upon which policy
is sold, an agent can increase or decrease commissions. "The most persistent abuse in life
insurance sales is replacement of existing policies with new policies. Since commissions
are based solely on first year premiums, many sales people spend much of their careers
persuading policyholders to forfeit their old policies and purchase new insurance." Fran-
kel, supra note 77, at 260.
92. Kimball & Jackson, supra note 69, at 193-96.
93. See supra note 8 for a statutory definition of "twisting."
94. Insurance trade journals often contain advertisements from insurers offering
agents high commissions to sell particular products. Insureds ultimately pay higher pre-
miums to cover these commissions. Examples of these advertisements directed to agents
abound: "Your disability commissions increase every year . . . all by themselves?" 86
BEST'S REviEw, LIFE/HEALTH INSURANCE EDIrION 133 (May 1985) (advertisement by
Provident companies); "Upon receipt of the first month's premium, Crown Life will send
you three months commission in advance." Id. at 79 (advertisement by Crown Life);
"Our Universal Life has better commissions than some others." Id. at 116 (advertisement
by Western Reserve Life); "Commission 15% for business effective during April and
May 1985. This is a special only for this two month period, starting June 1985 - 12%
commission," Insurance Advocate, May 4, 1985 at 12 (advertisement by Eagle Insurance
Company); "Lucrative Commissions, High first year schedule," Insurance Advocate,
April 13, 1985, at 25 (advertisement by John Adams Life Insurance Company); and
"Arrowhead is offering 20% Commission!," Insuranceweek, March 22, 1985, at 4 (adver-
tisement by Arrowhead General Insurance Agency).
95. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. §§ 284-23-300 to -470 (1983) (setting forth the
duties of agents, replacing insurers, existing insurers, and direct-response sales). The reg-
ulations also set forth notices which must be given by the agent or insurer to the policy-
holder. These notices detail the relative advantages and disadvantages in replacing
existing insurance and must be signed by the policyholder acknowledging receipt and
reading of the notice. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. § 284-23-500 to -503. Among other provi-
sions, the regulations require the insurer providing the replacement policy to notify the
existing insurer, thus giving the existing insurer a chance to retain its insured. WASH.
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more effectively by direct regulation than by statutes governing
rebating.
B. Discrimination
The second traditional argument advanced in support of
anti-rebate laws is that the laws prevent discrimination. 6 The
argument is based upon two principles. The first is the "'one-
price' idea, firmly rooted in the retail marketing traditions of the
American people. '97 The public is best served by the conve-
nience of uniform pricing. A product for sale should cost the
same no matter where it is purchased. The second principle is
that of social equality-similarly situated persons should pay
the same price for the same product.9 A rebate of part of the
purchase price undercuts these principles, since not everyone
receives a rebate or the same amount of rebate.99
In theory, the anti-rebate and anti-discrimination statutes
would appear to ensure that the principles of uniform pricing
and social equality are met. In actuality, the statutes merely
ensure that the insurer controls the ultimate price paid.100 All
persons do not pay the same price for the same policy, since
commercial insurance purchasers routinely negotiate agent and
broker commissions, 101 and certain marketing techniques such as
direct writing, mass merchandising, and group insurance may
result in lower premiums to persons in a position to benefit from
ADMIN. CODE R. §§ 284-23-450(d), 460(b).
96. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
97. PATTERSON supra 19, at 309.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
100. Insurance companies set the premium for a policy or agree to set a premium in
accordance with the agent's or broker's recommendations when selling a commercial pol-
icy. In either case, unless the insurer permits a reduced or increased commission in set-
ting the premium, no commission negotiation can occur. For a brief discussion of com-
mission rates and flexibility in agent and broker commission earnings for the sale of
group policies, see B. BEAM, GROUP INSURANCE: BASIC CONCEPTS AND ALTERNATIvES 305-09
(1982).
101. Schedule rating permits the agent or broker to tailor the premium rate to the
individual insured's actual loss potential and permits the agent or broker to reduce com-
missions. S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK & R. CLINE, PROPERTY AND LIABILITv INSURANCE 583-84
(3rd ed., 1982). In a later section on the regulation of agents and brokers, the authors
note the prohibition on rebating and in a footnote state: "This point is made mute (sic)
in those large premium cases where the agent arranges an insurance premium from the
insurer that is on a 'net cost' basis. The addition of the agent's commission or service fee
is a matter of negotiation." Id. at 602, n.12.
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these forms of marketing.101
Ironically, insurance companies do not violate anti-rebate
laws when a commercial buyer pays a discounted commission.
Nor do insurance companies violate anti-rebate laws when cer-
tain marketing techniques result in different premiums for the
same type and amount of insurance. The premium for the policy
reflects the negotiated commission; thus, there is no variance in
the stated premium of a policy.103 For example, the insurer may
quote a rate to a broker that is net of commission, and the bro-
ker will set a commission and quote a final premium to the
buyer. Moreover, the anti-discrimination statute permits insur-
ers to use acquisition costs as a factor in rate setting.104 There-
fore, if a sale to a particular person or group of persons can be
shown to result in a lower cost to the insurer, then the premium
can be lowered to reflect the cost savings. 105 Thus, the principles
of uniform pricing and social equality are undercut in actual
practice.
No one would suggest that insurers should be allowed or
encouraged to deviate from sound underwriting practices by
102. Certain marketing techniques result in lower premiums because the cost of
obtaining the business is lower. Group property-casualty insurance has been opposed by
some consumers, agents, and regulators because nongroup members cannot receive the
same cost savings for the same policy. See MoWBRAY, supra note 6, at 407-08. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company of America has met opposition in marketing group auto
insurance for consumers. The group plan saves money on commissions and other
expenses. A. TOBIAS, THE INmsr.LE BANKERS 241 (Washington Square Press pocket ed.
1982).
103. The anti-rebate statutes prohibit variance in the stated premium of a policy.
Coupled with the anti-discrimination statutes, which prohibit the charging of a different
premium rate for the same risk, all similarly situated persons are theoretically charged
the same price for the same policy. The Tennessee Attorney General has concluded that
the state's anti-rebate law would be unconstitutional if read as a total ban on rebates
and other inducements. He has concluded, however, that only discriminatory rebates are
prohibited. 86-16 Op. Att'y Gen. (1986).
104. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.480, supra note 4 (permitting "expense elements"
to be considered when determining whether discrimination has occurred).
105. See Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers v. Herrmann, 79 Wash. 2d 462, 486
P.2d 1068 (1971). In Herrmann, the court found that "mass marketing" which results in
lower expense for acquisition, including agent commissions, does not violate WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.18.480 (the anti-discrimination statute) since "the expression 'expense ele-
ments' includes an insurer's expenses incurred in the acquisition and maintenance of
policies or in the collection of premiums .... Discrimination based upon substantially
different expense elements is authorized by RCW 48.18.470." Id. at 465-66. (See supra
note 5 for language of WASH. REv. CODE § 48.18.480.) Could it be argued that an individ-
ual agent's reduction in service to the policyholder is a difference in expense allowing a
reduction in premium?
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charging someone less for a risk merely to increase sales. 10 6
Sound underwriting requires that enough funds be collected to
meet losses. Discrimination in this respect would not only be
unfair to the person charged more for the same risk but also
would be financially dangerous. 107 However, discrimination in
pricing for agent and broker services does not cause the same
financial danger to the insurer. 08 As to the unfairness in simi-
larly situated persons paying agents different commissions, soci-
ety not only tolerates this practice but encourages it.109 The
advent of discount securities brokerage firms," 0 discount retail-
ers of consumer goods, and franchising and discounting of legal,
medical, or other professional services severely challenges the
106. Despite the basic concept of collecting enough premium to cover a risk, insur-
ance companies abandoned strict underwriting standards in the past few years in an
effort to increase sales and obtain premium income for investment purposes, hoping to
offset underwriting losses with investment gains (cash-flow underwriting). Now that
interest and investment earnings have decreased, insurers are facing huge losses and con-
sumers are facing dramatic increases in premiums, "anywhere from 50 percent to 400
percent on risks without any corresponding increase in [loss] exposure." National Under-
writer, May 10, 1985 at 1. The result is a scramble by insurers to reduce expenses by
cancelling agency contracts, policies, and whole lines of business, id.; see also Insurance
Week, March 1, 1985, at 1; March 22, 1985, at 1; May 17, 1985, at 1; and May 31, 1985 at
1.
107. See generally MOWBRAY, supra note 6, at 459-72. The Washington Commis-
sioner recently adopted rules establishing standards for schedule rating plans used by
commercial property and casualty insurers to tailor premiums to individual risks, thus
taking into account a greater or lesser chance of a loss by the insured. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE R. 284-24-100; Wash. Admin. Reg. 85-23 (1985). In the first paragraph of the rules
the Commissioner finds "[t]hat existing schedule rating plans permit excessive credits or
debits, commonly resulting in discrimination against insureds or inadequate premi-
ums..." WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 284-24700. The Commissioner limited these debits or
credits to 25%. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 284-24-100 (2). The rules are an excellent example
of statutes, other than the rebate statutes, fulfilling the functions assigned to the rebate
statutes; the Commissioner based his authority to adopt the rules on the rate regulation
statute-WAsH. REv. CODE § 48.19.
108. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. If the insurer receives a constant
fixed amount for the insurance risk net of agent commission, the fact that the agent
receives much or little for his services will affect the agent, not the insurer. However, the
insurer could be indirectly affected if there are insufficient numbers of agents selling its
products, but this problem arises most often when an insurer sets a commission rate
which agents find unacceptable.
109. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 2, repealed provisions
permitting wholesale-retail price agreements. The analogy of repeal of Fair Trade laws
and repeal of anti-rebate laws has consistently been made by proponents of deregulation
of agent and broker commissions. See, e.g., Formisano, Property and Liability Insurance
Markets in a Net Pricing Framework, CPCU Journal, March 1981, at 40.
110. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1): "On or after [the
effective date of this act], no national securities exchange may impose any schedule or fix
rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged by its members."
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notion that everyone should pay the same price for services ren-
dered in connection with the sale of an insurance product."'
In short, a distinction must be drawn between discrimina-
tion in the price paid for the pure insurance risk and discrimina-
tion in the price paid for the services of agents and brokers. The
harms caused by discrimination in pricing the pure insurance
risk are not the same as the harms sought to be avoided in
preventing rebates of commissions.
When the equality and "one-price" principles are stripped
away from the discrimination argument, what is left is a
straightforward consumer protection argument. Rebating, as it
was practiced at the turn of the century, simply was unfair to
some consumers. Rebates were viewed as discriminatory because
the ability to obtain one was fortuitous, and agents awarded
rebates unequally. Thus, two people could see the same agent on
the same day to purchase the same policy yet only one receive a
rebate. Similar charges of unfair discrimination would be made
by consumers if a retailer arbitrarily permitted some persons in
the store to receive a lower price than others. However, the pos-
sibility that agents or brokers will negotiate rebates unfairly is
not sufficient to justify a complete prohibition on negotiation.
Unfair negotiation could be addressed by a statute directly
prohibiting unfair discrimination in pricing agent and broker
services. 11
C. Agent Professionalism
The final argument traditionally used to support anti-rebate
statutes is that such statutes promote agent professionalism.
Presumably, preventing agents from negotiating commission
rates ensures that agents will focus more on quality service than
on price.113 The irony in arguing that anti-rebate laws ensure
111. Courts have consistently held that agreements prohibiting deviations from set
fees by members of a professional association are illegal. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (striking down maximum fee schedule for
health care services). Similarly, attorney fees have been "deregulated." Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedule constitutes illegal price
fixing).
112. The court in Dade County addressed the argument that repeal of the anti-
rebate law would result in discriminatory pricing of agent services by noting that if
inducements to purchase insurance were not available to all individuals of the same class
and risk, such practice "would be considered an unfair method of competition or decep-
tive act or practice" under the Florida Insurance Code. 457 So. 2d at 499.
113. Justice Department Report, supra note 60, at 298. Whether a system of fixed
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professionalism is that the argument suggests that, given the
chance to rebate, a great number of agents and brokers would
abandon their high standards of professionalism. The argument
also ignores the extensive regulation of agents and brokers.
Statutes governing agent and broker licensing, qualifica-
tions, and business practices promote professionalism to a much
greater degree than anti-rebate laws." 4 Continuing education
requirements,' 15 disclosure requirements,' prohibitions on
"twisting" and misrepresentation," 7 and prohibitions on false
advertising and defamation of insurers by agents,"' all exist to
ensure agent professionalism. Moreover, the insurance commis-
sioner can revoke or suspend the license of any agent or broker
found by the commissioner to be "incompetent, or untrustwor-
thy, or a source of injury and loss to the public.""' 9 With these
types of statutes regulating agents and brokers, the question
becomes: Why would agents and brokers support a law that pro-
hibits them from negotiating their commissions or earnings?
At least one commentator has explained agent support for
anti-rebate statutes by noting the competition that existed prior
to enactment of the statutes and the desire of agents for market
protection. "Historically the agent has sought an artificial sup-
port for the existing market structure. He wanted assurance that
commission levels could not be undermined by sharp competi-
tive practices, and he viewed rebating as a danger to the proper
level of agency compensation." 20 Professionalism was partly
ensured by establishing stability and predictability in the
marketplace.
More recent views supporting the agent professionalism
argument tend to rely on the earlier position that anti-rebate
commissions promotes quality service has been the subject of debate in life insurance.
One author has recommended that to earn renewal commissions the agent must submit
evidence of service rendered to the policyholder. See Dorfman, Reformation in Life
Insurance Agents' Compensation, 43 RISK AND INS. 447-61 (Sept. 1976).
114. E.g., WASH. RV. CODE ch. 48.17 (1983) (regulating agents and brokers).
115. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 48.17.150 (authorizing the commissioner to adopt rules
setting the education requirements for continued licensing of an agent); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE R. 284-17-200 to 284-17-320 (1983) (implementing statutory education
requirements).
116. WASH. ADMIN. CODE, supra note 95.
117. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.30.180, .090 (1983).
118. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.30.040, .080 (1983).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.17.530(1)(h) (1983).
120. Kimball & Jackson, supra note 69, at 191.
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laws protect markets. 2' Proponents of anti-rebate laws suggest
that rebating attracts the unscrupulous, forces smaller agencies
out of business, and results in lower services to reduce price.'22
However, these arguments could be made in any industry to
support fixed prices. To the extent that consumers are willing to
pay for services, services will be provided. Poor service or inade-
quate service are more properly resolved by the statutes and reg-
ulations governing agents' and brokers' qualifications and licens-
ing. As noted earlier, this argument focuses upon the effects of
competitive pricing of commissions, not upon the anti-rebate
law's prohibitions and original purposes.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANTI-REBATE LAWS
In the last twenty years, the state anti-rebate laws have
come under increasing scrutiny. Two commentators reflect this
reevaluation in their stance: "While we are not prepared to
assert categorically that anti-rebate laws should be repealed, we
do challenge the traditional assumption that such laws are obvi-
ously desireable."'
23
In 1977, a Justice Department task group recommended
that "the process for determining the level of commissions [for
insurance agents and brokers] . . . must evolve from the inter-
play of market forces, subject only to federal and state disclos-
ure requirements."' 24 Four years after the Department's report,
the Insurance Commissioner of Wisconsin proposed legislation
to repeal the state's anti-rebate law. 25 That same year, Repre-
sentative LaFalce, Chairman of the United States House Small
Business General Oversight Subcommittee, introduced legisla-
121. Fenske, Proposal to Repeal Antirebate Law Stirs Emotional Outcry in Wis-
consin, Best's Insurance Management Reports, March 16, 1981, release No. 3. Mr. Stein-
back, executive secretary of the Professional Insurance Agents of Wisconsin, stated in
reference to the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner's proposal to repeal the anti-rebate
law: "It would nurture graft... [the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner is] hoping that
agents will get into an unholy price war and write policies at next to nothing ....
Unregulated competition will destroy [insurance] and ruin an established economic
mechanism which has benefited the Wisconsin economy as a whole." Id. at 2. See also
Formisano, supra note 109, at 33.
122. Id. Agent fear of competition from other agents practicing rebating may be
misdirected since insurers are cancelling agency contracts, lowering commission earnings,
and otherwise forcing smaller, cost prohibitive agencies out of business. Insurance Week,
May 31, 1985, at 15.
123. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 192.
124. Justice Department Report, supra note 69, at 302-03; see supra note 68.
125. Best's Insurance Management Reports, supra note 121.
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tion proposing a federal override of every state's anti-rebate
law.126 While these legislative approaches to permitting agent
commission negotiation have failed, the Florida court, by its
decision in Dade County, ultimately may force a change. The
recent lawsuit brought by Consumers Union against the Califor-
nia Commissioner 2 7 challenging the constitutionality of the
anti-rebate law suggests that in the absence of legislative action,
the courts will be asked to resolve the issue. The heart of the
debate over the anti-rebate law is whether negotiation of agents'
and brokers' compensation should be permitted and whether the
anti-rebate law, adopted nearly a century ago, is necessary or
desirable to protect insurance consumers. As one commentator
suggested in 1981, "It's time to dust off the anti-rebate laws...
and see if they really serve the purpose they were intended to
serve when they were put on the books in a totally different
age."' 28
Critics of the anti-rebate law argue that the law thwarts
competition, hurting both agents and policyholders, and that
any problems associated with repeal of the law are capable of
resolution under existing or additional regulations. 2 9 Critics fur-
ther argue that rebating still continues today in one form or
another and that rebating is difficult to regulate, thus leading to
inconsistent enforcement and unintended results.130
A. Difficulty in Regulation
Rebating is difficult to regulate because of problems in
defining and detecting a rebate and because rebating is viewed
as a legitimate marketing technique by the public and the busi-
ness community. 1 ' Several examples illustrate the variety of
questions that arise and reveal the inconsistency in enforcement.
An agent who engaged in the business of lending, real estate,
and insurance did not violate the anti-rebate law when the
agent, in taking loan applications, also obtained an agreement
126. See 1981 Hearing, supra note 86.
127. Consumer Union of United States v. Bunner, No. 84-3144 (Super. Ct. S.F. filed
July 17, 1985). See also "Consumer group sues to allow insurance discounts," Los Ange-
les Herald Examiner, July 17, 1985, at D-1, D-4.
128. Jaffe, Points & Viewpoints, National Underwriter, Property & Casualty Ed.,
Oct. 2, 1981, at 52.
129. See 1981 Hearing, supra note 86, at 4-20 (testimony of Susan Mitchell, Wis-
consin Insurance Commissioner).
130. Id.
131. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 186-92.
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by the borrower to buy insurance from the agent for the term of
the loan."3 2 However, if the agent had offered the loan as an
inducement to the purchase of insurance, the anti-rebate statute
would have been violated. 3'
An insurance company wishing to provide goggles to
employees of the insured manufacturer to reduce work-related
injuries could not provide the goggles without violating the anti-
rebate statutes.13 4 Similarly, a Florida insurer was asked to insti-
tute a program adopted by Michigan insurers of providing infant
car seats to automobile policyholders; the insurer refused, citing
the Florida anti-rebate statute.135
Under the anti-rebate laws, agents are strictly limited in
what they can give to policyholders. For example, Washington
prohibits the offering of any "goods, wares, or merchandise of an
aggregate value in excess of five dollars." 38 A business lunch
might violate this provision if the agent picks up the lunch tab
for a prospective client who has too hearty an appetite. 37 The
enforcement of this provision can be time-consuming, difficult,
and sometimes wasteful of regulatory resources. 38 For example,
a Michigan court deliberated the issue of whether an agent's
purchase of drinks for a prospective insured violated the anti-
rebate law "where the parties solicited are sober and mentally
normal."' 39 In 1985, the Washington Insurance Commissioner
advised a group of Eastern Washington insurance agents that a
promotional program offering anyone a chance to win a free trip
to Seattle to attend a Seattle Seahawks's football game was a
violation of the insurance code. 40 Said the Commissioner's
office: "The law may be out-of-date . ..but that is a problem
132. Calvin Phillips & Co. v. Fishback, 84 Wash. 124, 146 P. 181 (1915).
133. Key v. National Life Ins. Co., 107 Iowa 446, 78 N.W. 68 (1899).
134. PATrERSON, supra note 69, at 319 (citing W.U.R. Mass. 10 (1923)).
135. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 47, at 14 n. 3.
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.140(4) (1983).
137. 1981 Hearing, supra note 86, at 7 (testimony of Susan Mitchell, Wisconsin
Insurance Commissioner, noting similar examples as technical violations of the anti-
rebate law. Among Ms. Mitchell's examples: "The agent takes the client on a golf outing
and pays the fees; ... the agent gives the client a calculator or calendar.").
138. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 186.
139. Northern Assurance Company v. Meyer, 194 Mich. 371, 378, 160 N.W. 617, 619
(1916).
140. Letter from Deputy Commissioner Robert E. Johnson to Rion S. Groves and
Jerry F. Rochelle (October 24, 1985) (an "Advertising program to obtain leads for sale of
insurance with a prize in excess of $5 violates RCW 48.30.150, the illegal inducement
statute.")
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for the legislature, not us. We simply apply the laws given to
us. . . . It is too late to effectively stop [the offer, but]. . .[you]
have been put on notice that a program such as this is not to be
repeated. If it is, severe penalties will follow."141 The anti-rebate
law also affects routine business transactions that are indirectly
related to insurance business. For example, the California Insur-
ance Commissioner recently found that a percentage-of-sales
lease agreement between a commercial bank and an insurance
company for purposes of operating an agency probably violated
the anti-rebate law. 142 In contrast, the Tennessee Attorney Gen-
eral advised the Tennessee Commissioner that a similar percent-
age-of-sales lease agreement between a bank and an insurance
agency did not violate the state anti-rebate law.143
That some aspects of the anti-rebate law unnecessarily pro-
hibit legitimate business activity is evidenced by the actions of
some states in modifying anti-rebate laws to permit an agent or
broker to offset a consulting fee with commissions."4 4 Prior to
the statutory change, an agent specializing in pension and profit-
sharing program designs for employers was not permitted to
reduce the consulting fee if the agent subsequently sold insur-
ance for the program and earned a commission in addition to
141. Letter, supra, at 1.
142. Insurance Week, November 9, 1984, at 1, 4. The California Commissioner's
decision was a private letter ruling which was not and will not be made public. The
proposed lease agreement was between American National Bank and John Hancock
Mutual Life.
143. Opinion letter from Kate Eyler, Assistant Attorney General for Tennessee, to
Commerce and Insurance Commissioner John C. Neff (August 13, 1984). The proposed
lease agreement was between First Tennessee Bank and Craddock Insurance Agency.
The issue of agent/bank lease agreements and their possible violation of anti-rebate laws
is secondary to the primary political issue of whether and to what extent the business of
banking and insurance should be mixed. The issue became even more controversial with
the Comptroller of the Currency Staff Interpretative Letter No. 274 (December 2, 1983).
Brian Smith, Chief Counsel, in responding to the American Bankers Insurance Group in
Florida, concluded that "state insurance laws, such as laws barring the payment to or the
splitting of commissions with unlicensed parties, cannot bar a national bank and an
insurance agent from entering into a percentage lease." Comptroller Staff Interpretive
Letters, Federal Banking Law Reports, at 77,587 (85.438) (January 6, 1984 update).
The Washington State Supervisor of Banking has adopted a rule that would permit
state-chartered banks to enter percentage-of-sales lease agreements with insurance agen-
cies. The rule provides, in part: "(2) No bank or trust company may receive commissions
or other revenues from the lessee other than periodic rental payments received under
terms that are usual and customary in leasing space used for similar commercial pur-
poses as determined by the supervisor. . ." WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 50-12-100.
144. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.157.
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the fee. 1' 5 In effect, the law had enforced double billing for the
same service. Some states, however, still prohibit offsetting con-
sulting fees with commission earnings.14 6
Difficulties in enforcement stem in part from public percep-
tions of anti-rebate laws. An informal survey conducted in the
early 1960s revealed that generally "people unconnected with
the insurance business failed to see anything objectionable in
rebating. 1 47 The survey concluded that "policyholders by and
large see no objection to rebating. While insurance men do
oppose the practice, their attitude is partly a result of profes-
sional conditioning and partly self-interest.' 148 Moreover, the
public is accustomed to receiving rebates for a variety of prod-
ucts and services. Public support for anti-rebate laws is further
diminished since the laws punish both the offering and the
receipt of a rebate.149 Because both activities are impermissible,
neither party will reveal the rebate. Since the transaction can be
easily disguised if there is a threat of detection (for example, a
loan that has been repaid), the regulator may find that proof
and prosecution are impossible. These difficulties in regulating
rebates, placed in the context of greater regulatory concerns
such as company solvency, make effective enforcement of the
anti-rebate laws unlikely. 50
B. Competitive Disadvantages
In addition to presenting regulatory problems, the anti-
rebate law thwarts competition, hurting both the agent and the
policyholder. "[W]ith the emphasis on competition as the best
means to assure consumers of the lowest prices[,] . .. anti-
rebate laws are an anachronism.''5
The anti-rebate law, by prohibiting agents from negotiating
commission earnings, creates disincentives to compete, since an
145. See Charging of Fees by Licensees, 81 WASH. INS. COMM'R BULL. No. 2 (March
10, 1981).
146. Florida agents recently asked whether a fee could be offset with commission
earnings and were advised that such a practice would be prohibited. 96 INs. ADVOCATE 10
(1985) (reporting Florida Insurance Department General Counsel opinion).
147. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 190.
148. Id.
149. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 48.30.170 (rebate acceptance prohibited).
150. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 199.
151. Jaffe, supra note 128, at 52. See also Monitoring Competition: A Means of
Regulating the Property and Liability Insurance Business, NAT. A. INS. COUM'R, at 515-
23.
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agent will earn the same amount from the sale of a particular
policy as another similarly situated agent. Competition, there-
fore, must come from the insurance companies, as manufactur-
ers, rather than from agents, as retailers of policies and services.
However, since the agent's compensation is set by the insurer,
the agent's value is determined not by the purchaser or policy-
holder but by the insurer.152 "Companies compete for agents, not
buyers of their products, on the basis of the size of commissions
they offer."15 As noted earlier, if the insurer markets policies
that permit the agent to negotiate a commission by selling a pol-
icy with a lower commission rate, then the agent has an incen-
tive to reduce operating expenses so that lower commissions are
profitable. The agent who can make a profit with a lower com-
mission can gain a greater market share. Nevertheless, one study
found that independent agents, in choosing among different
companies' policies, frequently chose to sell the policy paying
the highest commission.'" Another report noted, "[One] Com-
pany has testified in several state hearings that it writes very
little credit life insurance because other underwriters' offerings
are structured to be far more lucrative to the seller. [The Com-
pany] stated that they were not competitive; their rates were too
low to provide enough commissions to attract lender and car
dealer interest.' 1155
Concern over compensation of insurance agents and brokers
and the effect of compensation systems upon insurance markets
has received international attention. In 1977, the Australian Law
Reform Commission published a discussion paper that, inter
alia, reviewed the need for statutory changes governing the mar-
keting of insurance. 56 After examining many different countries'
systems of insurance brokerage, the commission concluded that
brokers and agents who represent more than one insurer have an
152. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 191 n.164. "It was not the market value
of the agent to the policyholder that decided commission rates, but his value to a com-
pany whose main objective, at least in life insurance, tended to be rapid expansion."
153. 1981 Hearing, supra note 86, at 6.
154. Formisano, supra note 109 at 39 (citing J. David Cummins & Steven N. Weis-
bart, The Impact of Consumer Services on Independent Insurance Performance
(Glenmost, NY, IMA Education and Research Foundation (1977)).
155. John W. Wilson & J. Robert Hunter, Investment Income and Profitability in
Property/Casualty Insurance Ratemaking 50 n.1, Report by J. W. Wilson & Associates,
Inc. to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (1983).
156. Baxt, Commercial Law Note, 53 A. L.J. 153 (1979) (citing Insurance Contracts,
Discussion Paper No. 7, Australian Law Reform Commission (Cth), 1977.
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"institutionalized conflict between interest and duty."'15 7 After
extensive public hearings and comment by other government
agencies and private groups, the commission issued its final
report,158 concluding that "placement of insurance is sometimes
made on the basis of a broker's interest rather than that of his
client" and that attempts have been made by brokers to have
insurers increase commissions under threat of withdrawal of the
client's business.159 The commission noted other countries' con-
cerns with commission payments to life insurance agents and the
incentive for brokers to sell policies paying the highest commis-
sions.160 While conflicts of interest may arise with the payment
of commissions, the problem is worsened by the consumer's
inability to negotiate a fairer commission. The anti-rebate law
ensures that even if the consumer discovers an overly generous
commission, the consumer's only choice is to reject the insur-
ance. The critical difference between Australia's concern and the
United States Justice Department's concern is that Australia
and other commonwealth countries do not prohibit rebating. 6 '
In addition to being denied the advantages of price competi-
tion, consumers may not want or need the agent services that
are paid for with the premium. Moreover, the consumer is forced
to pay for these services whether or not the agent actually per-
forms them or performs them well. The essence of negotiated
commissions is the ability of the consumer to purchase the qual-
157. Baxt, supra note 156, at 154.
158. Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No. 16, Insurance Agents and
Brokers, (1980) [hereinafter cited as Commission Report No. 161.
159. Id. at 46. The commission acknowledged the professional brokers group's posi-
tion that most brokers would not look to their own interest since the broker would not
survive in a competitive market and thus the broker attempts to obtain the least expen-
sive coverage. Other government agencies found the commission's concern to be more
theoretical than practical; however, the commission adopted another agency's statements
as its own: "The public expects that an insurance broker, as a professional advisor, will
always act in his client's best interest. It seems, therefore, that a remuneration system
which does not ensure impartiality is inconsistent with the role of an insurance broker."
Id. at 47.
160. Id. at 94-96; U.S. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report on Life Insurance Marketing and Cost
Disclosure, 12 (1978) (Commission Report No. 16 at 94 n.2); CLAYTON, BRITISH INSURANCE
359-60 (1971) (Commission Report No. 16 at 41 n.39); Colenutt, The Regulation of
Insurance Intermediaries in the United Kingdom, 46 J. RISK & INS. 77, 82 (1979) (Com-
mission Report No. 16 at 41 n.42); Carruthers, Report 3 on Insurance Study, Ontario,
Canada (1975) (Commission Report No. 16 at 42 N. 43); Carruthers, Report 4 on Insur-
ance Study, Ontario, Canada (1975) (Commission Report No. 16 at 42 n.43).
161. Colenutt, supra note 160, at 77-86.
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ity and level of services desired.162
Under a system of fixed commissions, a consumer can only
purchase a particular service by paying for a full range of service
of which the particular, needed services is but one component.63
Whether a consumer actually uses an agent's services does not
affect the price the consumer will pay for the policy. "The pay-
ment of commissions out of gross premium gives the consumer
of insurance no opportunity to make a rational decision about
whether to [use] an [insurance] intermediary. Even if no inter-
mediary is [used] the majority of consumers must pay the same
gross premium charged."16" Moreover, some policies may not
have a sliding commission rate; thus, theoretically, a consumer
buys more service when purchasing greater insurance limits.
Critics have analogized the combination of policy and services
with the single price abuses of other "bundled" products in
other industries. "It is the overwhelming consensus of econo-
mists that unbundling in such areas as computers, securities,
and via deregulation of airlines and truckers has significantly
increased economic welfare by permitting supply of a wider vari-
ety of services and combinations of services at lower prices. 165
While commissions set by insurers may result in noncom-
petitive prices to policyholders, agents also can be hurt by
insurer pricing practices. This problem has become so acute
recently that the President of the National Association of Pro-
fessional Insurance Agents (PIA) has issued a plea to insurers
nationwide to maintain current commission levels. 66 Faced with
losses caused in part by cash flow underwriting,6 7 insurers are
reducing commission levels and cancelling agency contracts in
an effort to reduce expenses. 68 As a result, many agents are
being forced out of business. As President Bailey of the PIA
162. 1981 Hearings, supra note 86, at 31-37 (testimony of Mr. Burstein, economist).
163. Id. at 36.
164. Colenutt, supra note 160, at 82.
165. 1981 Hearings, supra note 86, at 33. Despite this argument of "unbundling"
products and services, it is important to note that some services provided by agents may
be imposed by law and may not be waived through negotiation. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN.
CODE R. § 284-023-450 (policy replacement, agent duties). A question arises as to
whether negotiation of commission earnings would pressure some agents to take short-
cuts in company or statutorily mandated services. In either case, however, the agent is
violating a standard that can be violated with or without the rebate law and that can be
enforced with or without the rebate law.
166. Insurance Week, June 14, 1985, at 3.




stated, "Growth in production and marketshare cannot be stim-
ulated by reducing commissions in the name of competition. "169
That single statement exemplifies the problem that is caused by
commissions fixed by insurers and that is enforced by the anti-
rebate law: agents are hurt because they may not be earning
enough to cover expenses and make a profit. Moreover, the
statement reinforces criticisms that consumers may be unable to
purchase a policy if no agent is willing to sell it because of low
commissions. "The ultimate consequence of anti-rebating laws,
which had as one purpose preservation of the agency system by
keeping up the compensation level, may be to undermine that
system .... ,170
In addition to the problem of inadequate compensation for
agents, efficient, better qualified agents may be paid the same
amount for their services as inefficient agents. If agents were free
to negotiate income, "more industrious or more able agents
would tend to command what economists call rents of ability.
The superiority of their services would command a premium in
the market. 1'7 Thus agents, as well as insurance purchasers, are
potentially harmed by the inability to bargain for needed
services.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO AN ANTI-REBATE LAW
Because the decision in Dade County has been upheld by
the Florida Supreme Court,172 the insurance industry and the
Florida Insurance Commissioner must decide how insurance will
be marketed in Florida without an anti-rebate law. Serious
problems could arise as a result of a repeal of the anti-rebate law
unless the effects of repeal are understood and alternatives to
complete repeal are considered.
Before any alternative to the anti-rebate law is considered,
two issues must be examined. First, the anti-rebate law is a
broad law prohibiting a wide range of activities or practices;
some of these activities or practices should continue to be pro-
hibited. Second, an understanding of current insurance market-
ing systems and methods is necessary to avoid unnecessary mar-
169. Id.
170. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 192.
171. 1981 Hearings, supra note 86, at 35.
172. See Department of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocates, No. 66,178 (June
3, 1986).
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ket disruptions by alternatives to the anti-rebate law.
The first issue is the most critical. The fundamental error to
be avoided in considering the anti-rebate law is the mistaken
belief that "rebating," as prohibited by the law, is just the
return of money to a policyholder or reduction in price that con-
sumers sometimes enjoy in purchasing other goods and ser-
vices. 173 Under the broad language of the anti-rebate statute,
"any other valuable consideration or inducement whatsoever
which is not expressly provided for in the policy" 17 4 constitutes a
rebate. Thus, the statute prohibits: acceptance of real or per-
sonal property or securities in lieu of premiums where the prop-
erty's value is considerably below the value of the policy; waiver
of a debt owed to an agent such as a premium finance note; ren-
dering of services without charge prior to the sale of a policy,
where those services would normally require compensation;
granting of loans on favorable terms which induce the purchase
of a policy; selling of stocks, bonds, or other securities as an
inducement to purchase insurance; and giving of any gift or
prize beyond a minimal value specified by statute.175 These are
not the only examples of "rebates"; but clearly the factors used
to determine whether a rebate has occurred extend beyond the
mere discounting of an insurance policy or return of a portion of
commission earnings.
An understanding of current market practices is important
to the selection of an alternative to anti-rebate law because not
all marketing systems are amenable to the practice of rebating,
and some systems may be damaged by permitting any form of
rebating. Thus, marketing systems should be reviewed to deter-
mine the impact of an alternative to an anti-rebate law upon the
relationships between consumer and agent or broker; between
the company and the agent or broker; and between agents, bro-
kers, or companies and other types of insurance and financial
service providers. For example, insurance may be marketed
through independent agents, salaried salespersons, direct mail or
advertising, brokers, group plans, financial institutions, or gen-
eral agents. Each of these marketing systems may involve con-
tracts between the companies and the sales force, may affect
other statutes (such as illegal tie-in sales by financial institu-
173. See MODEL ACT, supra note 40.
174. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.140(1) (1983).
175. See generally BROCK, supra note 19, at 383-410.
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tions), and may offer differing degrees of potential competition
in the event of a modification or repeal of the anti-rebate law.
For example, could an insurance company refuse to do business
with an agent who negotiates commissions? Could an insurance
company contractually prohibit negotiating commissions? Could
the effect of a decision to repeal the anti-rebate law and other-
wise deregulate commissions invite federal regulation, in the
absence of alternative state regulation showing the state's intent
to regulate agent and broker compensation? 178 Could agents or
brokers refuse to negotiate with some purchasers and demand a
full commission while granting a discount to other, similarly sit-
uated purchasers?
After reviewing the two basic issues of the scope of prohib-
ited activities under the anti-rebate law and the variety of insur-
ance marketing systems, reformers must consider the fundamen-
tal effects of negotiable commissions and, in particular, the
effect of competition at the retail level. This competition could
take one of two forms: rebating as a cash discount of commission
costs or net pricing of insurance so that the agent or broker
determines the commission independent of the costs for insuring
the risk.
In reviewing these two alternatives to fixed commissions,
the United States Justice Department found that rebating has
the advantage of an insurer-imposed ceiling on commission
income but the disadvantage of maintaining insurer control over
agent and broker income. Rebating also has the disadvantage of
being difficult to control and regulate.17 7 With respect to net
pricing, the Department identified the advantage as unrestricted
price competition, enabling the marketplace to exert maximum
pressure in determining agent and broker compensation. But the
Department identified four potential disadvantages to
unrestricted competition through net pricing: "Unrestricted
price competition between agents would: (1) force the small
agencies out of business; (2) overemphasize price vis-a-vis ser-
vice; (3) result in gouging of some consumers; and (4) produce
insignificant savings to the consumer."' 78 However, the Depart-
176. See generally Kintner, Bauer, and Allen, Application of the Antitrust Laws to
the Activities of Insurance Companies: Heavier Risks, Expanded Coverage, and Greater
Liability, 63 N.C. L. REv. 431-91 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Kintner].
177. See infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
178. Justice Department Report, supra note 60, at 297. See also 1981 Hearings,
supra note 86, at 75-81 (testimony of William Abus, associate general counsel, National
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ment argued that the problem of a reduction in the number of
agents or elimination of some smaller agents is not unique to the
insurance market, and deregulation of other markets has shown
that concentration of services has not occurred.17 9
The problem of the overemphasis of price rather than ser-
vice should be left to the marketplace. If agents provide services
consumers want, services will be provided although the value of
these services is determined in a competitive market. Moreover,
the Department noted that independent agents should fare bet-
ter than direct writers of insurance because a stronger fiduciary
relationship could be established between the agent and the pol-
icyholder.180 In responding to the problem of excessive commis-
sion rates, the Department noted that proper disclosure and
advertising of agent services and fees would allow consumers to
make informed choices. 8 1
Finally, in responding to the problem of insignificant sav-
ings, the Department noted that while not every type of insur-
ance will result in substantial savings, some lines of insurance
may. Moreover, in property and casualty insurance, where some
policyholders pay a disproportionate share of commissions,
deregulation would distribute costs more equitably.1 82
The Justice Department's reliance upon competition, sub-
ject to disclosure, assumes the application of federal antitrust
and pricing laws, since the report by the Department concerned
congressional action overriding state anti-rebate laws. 8" How-
ever, if a state modifies its anti-rebate law instead of repeals it,
the McCarran-Ferguson exemption would continue to preclude
application of federal antitrust and pricing laws. 84
Association of Life Underwriters).
179. Justice Department Report, supra note 60, at 297. See also Formisano, supra
note 109, at 41: "In sum, the experience of securities dealers and fair trade product
retailers indicates that although market changes occur, the 'destructive competition' and
'demise of the small merchant' arguments do not hold. Indeed, the consumer appears to
benefit from broadened use of different marketing and pricing strategies."
180. Department of Justice Report, supra note 60, at 298-301.
181. Id. at 301-02.
182. Id. at 302-03. Personal automobile insurance premiums are usually higher in
urban than in suburban areas for the same coverage because generally the risks are
higher in urban areas. However, the agent provides the same service to both insureds but
receives a greater commission on the sale to the urban insured since commission is a
percentage of the premium payment. If the agent provides the same service to both
insureds, should not each insured pay the same commission?
183. Id.
184. See Kintner, supra note 176, at 479.
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Competition with disclosure was the solution proposed and
adopted in Australia. The Australian Law Reform Commission
(LRC) reviewed three methods of resolving problems with remu-
neration of brokers: imposition of a client fee system, limits on
commissions, and disclosure of fees and commissions by the bro-
ker.18 Some brokers already may charge a fee in addition to
commissions. The LRC's proposal prohibited commissions and
required all of the broker's income to be paid for by the broker's
client. 86
Several concerns were raised, however, with an exclusive
fee-for-service system. First, in the life insurance market, bro-
kers might be at a competitive disadvantage with life agents if
brokers attempted to collect the full charge equivalent to the
high first-year commission paid to agents by insurers; thus, the
client might have substantially larger first-year costs with the
broker as compared with the agent.18 7 Second, an exclusive fee-
for-service system could eliminate the marketing function of
insurance brokering and evolve a new form of insurance spe-
cialty that would cause a rise in insurance costs, a reduction in
the rate of remuneration for brokers, and reduced service and
competition.'88 Third, the Insurance Council of Australia (ICA)
argued that the fee system ignored the tradition of commissions
and the degree of entrenchment of the commission system. 89
Finally, the ICA pointed out that such a fee system ignored the
fact that certain functions performed by brokers and paid for by
insurers would cease, leaving insurers with costs and tasks once
performed by brokers, such as policy preparation and co-
insurance. 90
With respect to maximum commission rates, the LRC noted
New York's system, which was designed to restrict commissions
and expenses, and found the limits anti-competitive.' 9 ' The lim-
its would discourage diversification of services by brokers and
might tend to result in costly regulatory enforcement.'92
Two main arguments were raised in opposition to disclos-
185. Commission Report No. 16, supra note 156, at 48-54.
186. Id. at 48. See also Dizard, Fees vs. Commissions, Institutional Investor, Aug.
1979, 125-26 (discussion of fee for service in the United States).
187. Commission Report No. 16, supra note 155, at 44.
188. Id. at 49.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 50.
192. Id.
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ure. First, critics argued that insureds are simply not entitled to
know how much a broker earns since consumers are not entitled
to such information from other salespersons.1 93 Second, critics
argued that such disclosure would be disruptive, leading con-
sumers to purchase directly from the insurer, thereby decreasing
competition.1 94 In response, the LRC pointed out the difference
between a salesperson working for a manufacturer or retailer
and a broker working for the insured. 95 The LRC compared
brokers to other professionals, from lawyers and surveyors to
stock brokers and real estate agents, and concluded that other
professionals must disclose their fees and "if insurance brokers
cannot justify to their own clients the level of their remunera-
tion, revision of the form and level of remuneration may well be
in the public interest." 96
The LRC responded to these arguments in a way which
reveals the distinction between the United States, using an anti-
rebate law, and some commonwealth countries such as Australia,
which do not prohibit rebates. 97 The LRC suggested that dis-
closure would lead insureds, in some cases, to "[a]pproach the
insurer for direct purchase at a reduced cost; seek a rebate from
the broker of a part of his commission; seek a total rebate of the
commission and either employ the broker on a fee-for-service
basis or . . . employ a different broker or an insurance consult-
ant."I98 Thus, disclosure works because consumers use the infor-
mation to negotiate the type and level of compensation.
The final recommendation of the LRC was implemented by
the Australian Parliament: adoption of the Insurance Agents
and Brokers Act. The Act provides that brokers must disclose,
as soon as is possible, all fees charged for services; brokers addi-
tionally must, upon request, disclose any commission or other
benefit received by the broker from the insurer.199
While the Australian Act and Commission recommenda-
tions offer some possible solutions, other options are available.
Rather than enact a blanket repeal of the anti-rebate law, a
193. Id. at 51.
194. Id. at 52.
195. Id. at 51.
196. Id. at 52.
197. PATrERSON, supra note 19, at 309.
198. Commission Report No. 16, supra note 155, at 51-52.
199. Insurance (Agents and Brokers) Act 1984, AusTL. AcTs P. Part IV Section 32.
See also 58 LAW INST. J. 1210-11 (Oct. 1984).
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state could specifically address particular problems with the law
and could adopt a transitional approach to bringing an end to
fixed commissions. For example, the anti-rebate law could be
modified to increase the statutory amount that an agent could
spend on entertaining clients and instituting promotional con-
tests.2 0 0 The law also could be modified to permit regulatory
approval of safety programs that technically violate anti-rebate
prohibitions, such as authorizing companies to give child-safety
seats to policyholders. 201 Finally, the law could be modified by
removing penalties for receipt of a rebate, thereby removing
some obstacles to proving that a rebate has occurred.2 02
In addition to resolving particular problems with the anti-
rebate law, a state could subject negotiated commissions to regu-
latory review and approval, thus permitting a gradual implemen-
tation of competition in the sale of insurance. A system could be
designed that would authorize the insurance commissioner to
review specific proposals by agents or brokers for instituting a
fee-based compensation program in lieu of commission earnings
where such a program would result in adequate disclosure to the
insurance buyer and minimal potential for consumer abuse. For
example, because commercial insurance purchasers already
negotiate agent and broker compensation through insurance
company policy design, the commissioner could authorize
straightforward negotiations without the need for insurer
involvement. 03 Furthermore, a statute could authorize a system
200. Substitute House Bill No. 2018, passed by the Washington State House Com-
mittee on Financial Institutions and Insurance, would increase the Washington limit on
expenditures by agents and brokers from $5 to $25 (S.H.B. 2018 § 1 sub§ 4 and § 2, sub§
3).
201. S.H.B. 2018 provides that "the Commissioner may approve programs sponsored
by insurers, agents, or brokers that are primarily designed to promote the public health
and safety." S.H.B. 2018 § 1, sub§ 5(b). When the Illinois state legislature adopted a law
requiring restraint of children in motor vehicles, an amendment was made to the state
anti-rebate law to exempt companies providing child-safety seats to policyholders. The
amendment provides,
Nothing in this section shall prevent a company from offering a child pas-
senger restraint system or a discount from the purchase price of a child passen-
ger restraint system to policyholders, when the purpose of such restraint sys-
tem is the safety of a child and compliance with the "Child Passenger
Protection Act, approved June 27, 1983, as amended." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73 1
763 § 151 (Smith-Hurd 1986 Supp.).
202. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 189-92.
203. S.H.B. 2018 provides in part, "Notwithstanding the provisions of [the anti-
rebate law]: (a) An insurer, general agent, agent, or broker may waive all or part of the
commission to be earned from the sale of an insurance policy to a charitable, civic, or
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of net-pricing for the agent or broker who acts as a financial
planner, thereby permitting the agent or broker to charge a sin-
gle fee for all services provided. Such a system could avoid the
conflict of interest arising when the agent, acting as financial
planner, develops a plan requiring the purchase of insurance
that will result in commission earnings to the agent.
Regardless of the modification of the anti-rebate law cho-
sen, certain practices now prohibited by the law should be per-
mitted while others that are injurious to consumers should be
banned. 20 As one critic stated twenty-five years ago, "Rebating
• . . should perhaps be confined to a narrower compass by a
closer examination of the evil to be prevented. There may even
be an argument for repealing this prohibition altogether. "20
CONCLUSION
For over half a century, agents and brokers have been pro-
hibited from deviating from the commission rates established by
insurers for the sale of insurance policies. The competitive
abuses caused by agents who rebated commissions occurred at a
time when the insurance industry was minimally regulated.
Moreover, consumer protection attitudes of fifty years ago have
changed dramatically. Today's comprehensive regulation of
insurance and the changed view of consumer protection have
challenged the fundamental assumptions underlying anti-rebate
laws.
The recent Florida decision striking down the state anti-
rebate statute follows closely on the heels of the congressional
move to override state anti-rebate laws and Wisconsin's proposal
to repeal its own anti-rebate law. The Dade County opinion and
the hearings in Congress suggest that the time for review of the
anti-rebate statutes has arrived. State legislatures should review
these laws before Congress or the courts act to void or otherwise
override them.206
commercial enterprise or organization .... " § 1, sub§ (5)(a) (1986).
204. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
205. Kimball and Jackson, supra note 69, at 200.
206. The Washington State Legislature has been reviewing agent and broker com-
pensation and the state's anti-rebate law. During the fall of 1985, the House Financial
Institutions and Insurance Committee conducted hearings on proposals to deregulate
commissions. In 1986, the committee adopted legislation exempting commercial insurer
transactions from the anti-rebate law and granting authority to the insurance commis-
sioner to exempt practices that technically violate the law but which promote public
health or safety. Ultimately, the legislation died in the House Rules Committee. (S.H.B.
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Traditional arguments supporting anti-rebate laws are
insufficient to sustain these laws. That competition through
negotiation of insurance agent and broker commissions may lead
to unfair practices is insufficient to justify a blanket prohibition
on such negotiation. Competition in agent and broker commis-
sions may save the consumer money, may result in a higher
quality of service, and may permit agents and brokers greater
freedom to determine income. The anti-rebate laws should be
modified to the extent that they prohibit sound business prac-
tices and competition and thereby deprive consumers of the
ability to make informed choices for the type and level of service
needed.
If competition is introduced into agent and broker commis-
sions, specific legislation addressing potentially abusive market-
ing practices could lessen or prevent the incidence of unfair
practices that could arise in a competitive market. Absent a
complete reversion to negotiated commissions, the anti-rebate
law could be modified to permit insurers to institute innovative
safety programs, to permit agents to spend more to entertain cli-
ents and establish promotional programs, and to permit negotia-
tion of commissions in those types and markets of insurance
that are least prone to abuse. Proper regulation governing unfair
pricing of agent and broker services, proper disclosure, and a
gradual introduction of commission negotiation into insurance
markets would benefit both agents and consumers.
John S. Conniff
No. 2018 by Committee on Financial Institutions and Insurance) (1986).
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